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DOUGLAS A. KAHN, Professor of Law, University
of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, Michigan, and
EARL M. COLSON, of the Washington, D.C. Bar

The gift tax is imposed on the
"transfer of property by gift." IN
TERNAL REVENUE CoDE OF 1954
(hereafter "Code") §2501. The term
gift is not expressly defined either
in the Code or in the Treasury Regu
lations. However, section 2512 (b),
dealing with the valuation of gifts,
states that "where property is trans
ferred for less than an adequate
and full consideration in money or
money's worth," the difference be
tween the value of the property
transferred and the consideration
received constitutes a gift.

Thus, for gift tax purposes, the
determination of whether a gift was
made does not turn so much on the
intent of the transferor as it does
on the mechanics of the transfer
whether property was transferred
without full and adequate consid
eration in money and money's
worth. Treas. Reg. §25.2511-l (g)
(1). The absence of donative intent
still can be a significant factor.
The gift tax applies only to trans
fers by individuals, but a transfer
of property by an entity such as a
corporation may be attributed to
·
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individuals, e.g., the corporation's
shareholders. See Treas. Reg. §25.2511-l (h) (1).
TRANSFER OF PROPERTY

Only the transfer of property is
subject to the gift tax. No gift tax
is imposed on account of the con
tribution of personal services. Cf.
Rev. Rul. 56-472, 1956-2 CuM. BuLL.
21.
Virtually every kind of property,
tangible or intangible, including
state and municipal securities that
are immune from federal income
taxes, is subject to the gift tax.
Treas. Reg. §25.2511-l (a). For ex
ample, transfers of royalty rights,
life insurance, partnership interests,
and checks or notes of third parties
are subject to the gift tax.
The gift tax applies to transfers
of property without full and ade
quate consideration in money or
money's worth regardless of the
manner in which made. Among
others, the tax applies to indirect
transfers, to transfers in trust, and
to gifts of future interests.
Illustration a:
F transferred $100,000 to his son, S,
upon S's promise to pay X, his sis
ter, a comparable annuity. F has

made an indirect gift of the annu
ity to X. lf, however, F made the
gift to S with no obligation, and if
S, on his own initiative, made a
comparable gift to X, there are two
gifts: F's gift td Sand S's gift to X,
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both of which are taxable events.
Illustration b:

If an heir or beneficiary of an es
tate refuses to accept his interest in
an estate, he has made a taxable
gift if under the local law he could
not prevent the passage of title to
himself by renouncing. Treas. Reg.
§25.2511-l (c); William L. Maxwell,
17 T.C. 1589 (1952). See also Kra
koff v. United States, 439 F.2d 1023
(6th Cir. 1971), where a widow's
attempted renunciation of her sur
vivorship interest in bank accounts
and corporate stocks she held joint
ly with her deceased husband was
deemed to be ineffective under state
law and therefore her relinquish
ment of her property rights consti
tuted a taxable gift. Even where a
beneficiary is permitted to renounce
his interest in an estate, he must do
so within a reasonable time after
learning of the transfer to avoid
a gift tax. Treas. Reg. §25.2511-1 (c).
lt should be noted that a sizable
number of states, by statute, permit
an heir to renounce his interest in
an estate so that the renunciation
relates back and constitutes a non
acceptance, but many states do not.
Section 2-801 of the Uniform Pro
bate Code, which, at this writing,
has been adopted by 10 states, pro
vides for renunciation by heirs, and
the American Bar Association has
published a model disclaimer act in
4 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST J. 658
(1969).
82
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c:

G died testate in 1944 and be
queathed his estate to a testamen
tary trust in which his widow, W,
had a life income interest. On W's
death, the trust corpus was to be
divided equally between G's two
sons, R and S, if they survive W.
If either son failed to survive W,
his share of the trust corpus was to
be distributed to his issue. W died
in March 1963, and in May 1963, R
filed a disclaimer of his half inter
est in the trust, which disclaimer
became effective in September 1963.
Accordingly, R's half interest in the
trust became the property of R's
issue. The question was whether
R's renunciation constituted a gift
for gift tax purposes.

In Keinarth ti. Commissioner, 480
F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973), rev'g 58.
T.C. 352 (1972), the Court held
that, in determining whether a re
nunciation of a remainder interest
was made within a reasonable time,
the period is to be measured from
the earliest date that the remainder
man's interest is not subject to di
vestiture. R's renunciation was not
a gift for gift tax purposes, since it
was made within six months after
the death of the life income bene
ficiary ( W), which is the date on
which R's interest became inde
feasible. The renunciation of the
remainder interest was timely, even
though it was made 19 years after
the interest was created in G's will.

Since R's interest was subject to di
vestiture if he failed to survive W,
the period is measured from W's
death. The Commissioner and the
Tax Court had determined that the
period should be measured from
the date of G's death and, there
fore, the renunciation was a taxable
gift.
Illustration d:

A fiduciary who waives his right
to statutory commissions after per
forming services may be deemed to
have made a gift to the beneficiaries
involved. Rev. Rul. 64-225, 1964-2
CuM. BuLL. 15. However, there is
no gift where the fiduciary waives
his right to commissions either be
fore commencing his services (Rev.
Rul. 56-472, 1956-2 CuM. BuLL. 21),
or within a reasonable time after
commencing to serve where all the
executor's actions are consistent
with a gratuitous performance of
services. Rev. Rul. 66-167, 1966-1
CuM. BuLL. 20. Also, a testamen
tary trustee's waiver of his right to
an increase in commissions under
a state law raising the statutory fees
did not constitute a gift where the
waiver was made shortly after the
increase in fees had been adopted
by the state legislature. Rev. Ru!.
70-237, 1970-1 CuM. BuLL. 13.
Generally the gift tax applies
only to transfers of property, and
therefore the performance of serv
ices without compensation does not
constitute a gift. However, once
83
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personal services have been con
verted into a property right for
compensation, it is arguable that
the forgiveness of the debt will con
stitute a gift. A reasonable argu
ment can also be made that the for
giveness in this case is merely an
adjustment of the price to be paid
for the services and should not con
stitute a gift, even if the price ad
justment is made after the services
have been performed. The Com
missioner's position has not yet
been tested in litigation.
Illustration e:

Forgiving a debt may constitute a
gift. Selsor R. Haygood, 42 T.C.
936 (1964), acquiesced in result,
1965-1 CuM. BuLL. 4. F lent his
son, X, $12,000. Subsequently F
forgave X the debt at a time when
X was not financially sound and
could have paid F only 50 cents on
the dollar. Assuming that the can
cellation of the debt was donatively
motivated, F made a gift to X of
the fair market value of X's obliga
tion, which might be valued as low
as $6,000.
Illustration f:
W owned a life insurance policy on
the life of her husband, H, and she
designated X as beneficiary of the
policy. W retained the power to

change the beneficiary of the policy.
Upon H's death, the owner of the
policy, W, is deemed to have made
a gift to X, the beneficiary, of the

July 15

proceeds of the policy. Goodman v.
Commissioner, 156 F.2d 218 (2d
Cir. 1946). Indeed, in such cases,
the Commissioner has ruled that
since the gift to X is not complete
until after H died, the split gift
provisions of section 2513 are not
applicable. Rev. Ru!. 73-207, 1973-1
CuM. BuLL. 409.
If, however, W had irrevocably
designated X as the beneficiary and
had retained no other beneficial in
terest in the policy, like the power
to surrender the policy or to bor
row against the cash value, the
designation of beneficiary would
constitute a completed gift of the
policy at the time of designation.
Illustration g:

A transferred property to T in
trust to pay the income to himself
for life, remainder to X. The re
mainder interest, determined by
deducting the value of A's income
rights, is a completed gift subject
to the gift tax. The value of A's
income rights at the date of trans
fer is determined under tables set
forth in Treas. Reg. §25.2512-9(f).
In Johnson v. United States, 254
F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966), the
District Court held that large bona
fide loans to children or children
in-law, which were repayable with
out interest, did not constitute a
gift for gift tax purposes. The
Commissioner has ruled that an
interest free loan is a gift to the
84
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borrower of the value of the use of
the money, and the Commissioner
will not follow the fohnson deci
sion. Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 CuM.
BULL. 408. See Gertrude H. Black
burn, 20 T.C. 204 (1953).
Under the Commissioner's view,
if an interest-free loan is made for
a term of years, with the note ma
turing at' a specified date, the gift
is made on the same date that the
loan is given, and the amount of
the gift is the value of the right to
use the borrowed cash for the pe
riod of the loan. However, if the
loan is made for a noninterest bear
ing demand note, a gift is made in
each calendar quarter that the debt
is outstanding of the value of the
use of the money for that quarter.

1968-2 CuM. BuLL. 3. Also, where a

TRANSFERS FOR BUSINESS
PURPOSES

85

bargain sale to an employee is mo
tivated by business judgment, the
transfer is not subject to the gift
tax. Estate of Monroe D. Anderson,
8 T.C. 706 (1947).
Where a transfer of property is
made for profit motives or for the
purpose of making a bona fide eco
nomic settlement of a claim against
the transferor, the gift tax is not
usually applicable. See Catherine S.
Beveridge, 10 T.C. 915 (1948), ac
quiesced in, 1949-1 CuM. BuLL. 1;
Gertrude Friedman, 40 T.C. 714
(1963), acquiesced in, 1964-1 Cu.M.
BULL. 4.
Political Contributions

The Commissioner has ruled that
contributions to political organiza
tions and political action groups
are subject to the gift tax, even
though the donor may hope to
profit therefrom. Rev. Rul. 59-57,
1959-1 CUM. BuLL. 626. His view
was undercut by the decision in
Stern ti. United States, 436 F.2d
1327 (5th Cir. 1971), where the tax
payer had given large contributions
to secure the election of a "reform
slate" that was dedicated to curing
the economic ills of the State of
Louisiana. The Court held that the
contributions were not gifts be
cause of the business transaction
exception. Since it was conceded
that the contributions were made
bona fide, at arm's length, and
without donative intent, the satis·

A transfer for inadequate consid
eration is not necessarily taxed as a
gift. ln particular, those transfers
made in the ordinary course of
business arc not deemed gifts, de
spite the lack of full and adequate
consideration. Treas. Reg. §25.25128. The regulations define a busi
ness transaction as one that is
"bona fide, at arm's length, and
free from any donative intent."
Accordingly, the gift tax is not
imposed on the sale of property for
less than its market value where
the seller makes an error in busi
ness judgment. Carl E. Weller, 38
T.C. 790 (1962), acquiesced in,

85
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faction of these three criteria re
moved the transfer from the gift
category.
The ruling in Stern conforms
with the purpose of the gift tax· to
complement the estate and income
taxes by exacting a tax on the trans
fer of property to another. A politi
cal contribution is more like con
sumption than transfer, on which a
gift tax should not be imposed.
However, the Commissioner an
nounced that he will not follow the
Stern decision except in cases in the
Fifth Circuit that are factually in
distinguishable. TIR-1125 (1972),
Rev. R u!. 72-583, 1972-2 CuM. BULL.
534, and Rev. Ru!. 72-355, 1972-2
CuM. BULL. 532.
The Commissioner did rule that
contributions made by a donor to
a number of political organizations
will be treated as a gift to separate
donees, each of which can qualify
for the $3,000 annual exclusion, ex
cept that organizations which have
essentially the same officers and
supported candidates and no sub
stantial independent purpose will
be treated as one donee, and gifts
to them will be aggregated. Rev.
Ru!. 72-355, 1972-2 CuM. BuLL. 532.
See Rev. Ru!. 74-199 for a state
ment of the evidentiary require
ments that must be satisfied to
qualify a gift to a political organi
zation for an annual exclusion.
Believing that the Commission
er's ruling was too generous to
political donors, and that gifts to
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political organizations which sup
port the same candidate should be
aggregated, one consumer-type
group brought an injunctive suit
against the Commissioner to pre
vent him from applying his ruling,
and the ruling was held invalid by
the District ·Court for the District
of Columbia. Tax Analysts & Ad
vocates v. Shultz, 34 Am. Fed.
Tax R.2d 74-5289 (D.C. 1974). It
appears that the Government will
appeal this decision, presumably
both on the merits and on the ques
tion of jurisdiction. Cf. Bob fones
University v. Simon, 33 Am. Fed.
Tax R.2d 74-1279 (USSC 1974);
Alexander v. "Americans United,"
Inc., 33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 74-1289
(USSC 1974).

1t is noteworthy that Congress is
currently considering a statutory
proposal that would exempt gifts to
political organizations from the gift
tax.
INVOLUNTARY TRANSFERS

The gift tax applies only to vol
untary transfers of property. Thus,
a payment made under the com
pulsion of a tort judgment dod
not constitute a gift. Cf. Harris v.
Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106 (1950).
The payment of an award might
also meet the criteria of the regu
lations defining business transac
tions. Treas. Reg. §25.2512-8.
TRANSFERS FOR CONSIDERATION

A transfer of property is not re86
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moved from the reach of the gift
tax merely because it was made for
consideration. To be exempt from
tax, the consideration received must
equal in value the property trans
ferred and must be received "in
money or money's worth." Moral
consideration, past consideration,
or consideration in the form of a
detriment to the transferee that
does not benefit the trans£eror will
not bar the imposition of the tax.

taxes are in pari materia. Merrill v.
Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945). Accord

Illustration a:

Since the remarriage of X, a widow,
to A would result in her forfeiting
·a $100,000 interest in a trust estab
lished by her first husband, A gave
her $100,000 upon her promise to
marry him. There is a gift from A
to X. X's promise to marry A is
not sufficient consideration because
it cannot be valued in money or
money's worth. Although X's loss
of interest in the trust is a detri
ment to her, it does not constitute
a benefit to A. Thus, there is a gift
tax on A's transfer. Commissioner
v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945).
Relinquishment of Marital Riglits

Under the estate tax statutes, the
relinquishment of marital rights,
incuding dower, curtesy, and statu
tory estates in lieu thereof, does not
constitute consideration in money
or money's worth. Code, §2043(b).
The Supreme Court has applied
this estate tax provision to the gitt
tax on the ground that the two

87

ingly, a husband's transfer of prop
erty in exchange for his wife's re
linquishment of her marital rights
constitutes a taxable gift to the
wife.
However, under section 2516, a
transfer of property from one
spouse to the other pursuant to a
written agreement relative to their
marital and property rights shall be
deemed to have been made for "fuil
and adequate consideration in
money or money's worth," provided
that the spouses are divorced within
two years after the execution of the
agreement.
Although every effort should be
made to comply with section 2516
where applicable, if, for some rea
son, the terms of the statute are not
satisfied-if, e.g., the divorce oc
curs more than two years after the
agreement-the transferor may con
tend that a transfer in anticipation
of a divorce is not voluntarily made
and therefore is exempt from the
tax. The Supreme Court's decision
in Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S.
106 (1950), provides substantial sup
port for that contention. See Rosen
thal v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 505
(2d Cir. 1953). But it is unlikely
that the Service will accept that
contention without litigating the
issue.
Relinquishment of Support

It now appears settled that a
87
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wife's relinquishment of her right
to support constitutes consideration
in "money or money's worth." The
Service has ruled that support
rights are money's worth, Rev. Rul.
68-379, 1968-2 Cur.r. BuLL. 414, su
perseding E.T. 19, 1946-2 CuM.
BULL. 166, though there are two
court decisions involving estate
taxes to the contrary. Meyer's Es
tate v. Commissioner, 110 F.2d 367
(2d Cir. 1940); Estate of Robert
Manning McKeon, 25 T.C. 697,
706-707 (1956), acquiesced in, 19582 Cur.r. BuLL. 6. The administra
tive position of the Service, as evi
denced by its rulings, and the more
recent court decisions clearly es
tablish that the wife's support rights
qualify as money's worth consid
eration. See H.B. Hundley, 52 T.C.
495 (1969), aff'd, 435 F.2d 1311 (4th
Cir. 1971); Estate of Hubert Keller,
44 T.C. 851 (1965); Estate of Mor.rison T. O'Nan, 47 T.C. 648 (1967),
acquiesced in, 1967-2 Cur.r. BuLL. 3.
A transfer in satisfaction of the
duty to support the minor children
of the transferor is made for
money's worth. Estate of Robert
Manning McKeon, 25 T.C. 697
(1956), acquiesced in, 1958-2 CuM.
BULL. 6.
Support payments to indigent
adult children that are required to
be made by state law were held to
be gifts in Commissioner v. Greene,
119 F.2d 383 (9th Cir. 1941 ), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 641 (1941). How
ever, Greene was decided by a di·
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vided court and the result is diffi
cult to rationalize.
INCOMPLETE TRANSFERS

·

A transfer of property is not sub
ject to the gift tax unless it is com
plete and irrevocable. A transfer
that may be revoked by the donor
alone or in conjunction with any
party who does not have a substan
tial adverse interest in the revoca
tion is not a completed gift for tax
purposes. Burnet v. Guggenheim,
288 U.S. 280 (1933). Similarly,
where the donor has retained the
power, either alone or in conjunc
tion with others who do not have
a substantial adverse interest, to
change the beneficiaries of the gift,
the transfer is not complete for gift
tax purposes. Sanford's Estate v.
Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39 (1939).
1f the donor's power to change
beneficiaries is limited to the bene+
ficiaries of either the income or the
remainder interest in the trans
ferred property, then the gift is in
complete as to that interest only.
Thus, if the donor retained the
power to change the income bene
ficiary of a trust from A to B, but
he did not retain a power to change
the remainderman, the gift of the
income interest is incomplete, but
the gift to the remainderman is
complete.
Illustration a:
A transferred property to T in
trust for A for life, remainder to
88

1975

B. This is a completed gift of the

remainder interest, because the do
nor has relinquished all control
over that interest. However, if A had
retained the power to revoke the
whole trust, there is no gift. If A
can revoke only with the consent
of T, who does not have a substan
tial adverse interest, there is no
completed gift. If A can revoke
only with B's consent, then the gift
is complete.
The mere delivery without con
sideration of a personal check or
note of the transferor does not con
stitute a completed gift, because
no enforceable obligation is in
curred. The Service has stated that
the transfer of a personal check be
.comes complete and therefore tax
able when it is paid, certified, or
accepted by the drawee, or is ne
gotiated for value to a third person.
Similarly, payment or transfer for
value is necessary to complete a
gift of a negotiable note. Rev. Rul.
67-396, 1967-2 CuM. BuLL. 351.
Though there exists a conflict
among the court decisions which
have passed on these transfers
compare /ohn D. Archbold, 42
B.T.A. 453 (1940), with Commis
sioner v. Copley's Estate, 194 F.2d
364 (7th Cir. 1952), aff'g 15 T.C.
17 (1950)-the more recent deci
sions support the Service. E.g.,
Eleanor· A. Bradford, 34 T.C. 1059,
1065 (1960). See Rev. Rul. 69-347,
1969-1 CuM. BuLL. 227.
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A gift causa mortis is incomplete
during the life of the donor. If a
transfer is made in anticipation of
death from a specific illness and
contingent on such death occurring,
and if the transferor recovers from
his illness and the transferee ac
cordingly returns the funds, neither
the original transfer nor the return
of the funds to the transferor is
subject to the gift tax. Rev. Ruf.
74-365, 1074 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 28.
Completed Transfers

Where the donor's power to alter
or revoke the transfer can be exer
cised only with the consent of a
party with a substantially adverse
interest, the transfer is complete for
gift tax purposes. Commissioner v.
Prouty, 115 F.2d 331 (1st Cir. 1940).
Illustration b:
A transferred property to T in
trust for C for life, remainder to
D, and A reserved the power to

alter or amend the trust as he sees
fit. The transfer is not complete
and there is no taxable gift. If,
however, A later amends the trust
so that he can exercise the power
of further amendment only with
the consent of C, there will then be
a complete transfer and a taxable
gift on C's life estate, but not as to
D's remainder interest. The gift of
C's life estate is effected on the date
that the amendment was made. C
does not have an adverse interest as
to A's alteration of the remainder
89
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interest in the trust; hence the re
quirement that C consent to such
alterations does not render com
plete the transfer of the remainder
interest in the trust.
Where the donor's reserved power
to alter a transfer can affect only
the time when the transferred
property will be received by the
beneficiaries, there is a completed
gift at the date of the transfer.
Treas. Reg. §25.2511-2(d).
Illustration c:
A transferred property to T in trust
to pay the income annually to B

for 20 years, and at the end of that
period, to distribute the corpus to
B or B's estate. A retained the
power to direct T to accumulate
the income in any year and to dis
tribute it together with the corpus
after the expiration of the 20:year
period. B's interest in the trust is
vested, and only the timing of en
joyment is subject to change.
Therefore, A has made a completed
gift that is subject to the gift tax.
Of course, when the grantor has
a power to revoke subject to the
approval of an adverse party, or
when he has the power to affect the
timing of enjoyment of the trans
fer, the property is includable in the
gross estate of the donor at his
death under section 2038, even
though the transfer is treated as a
completed gift.
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Where a donor retains a power
such as the power to revoke, pre
venting a transfer from constitut
ing a completed gift, the subse
quent relinquishment of that power
by the grantor creates a gift at the
date of relinquishment. Treas. Reg.
§25.2511-2 (f). Similarly, when in
come from an incomplete transfer
is paid to a beneficiary and thus
placed beyond the control of the
donor, there is a completed gift ot
the income at the date of payment.
Illustration d:
A declared himself trustee of cer

tain properties owned by him. Un
der the declaration of trust, the
trustee is to distribute the income
quarterly between B and C in such
proportions as the trustee shall de
termine in his discretion. Upon the
death of the survivor of B and C,
the trust corpus is to be distributed
to X or his estate. The trust is irre
vocable. Since A retained the power
as trustee to change the proportion
ate interests of B and C, the gift of
the income interests was incom
plete, and consequently A incurred
no gift tax liability. However, the
gift of the remainder interest to X
was complete. Subsequently, A re
signed, and T was appointed as
trustee in A's place. Since A's
power over the income interest was
terminated by his resignation, the
gift of the income interest became
complete at that date. Prior to the
resignation of A, any current in90
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Also, the creation of and contri
bution to a joint brokerage account
registered in the name of a nom
inee of the brokerage firm does not
constitute a gift unless and until
the joint owner draws on the ac
count for his benefit. Rev. Rul. 69148, 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 226.

come of the trust that was actually
distributed by the trustee to either
B or C was placed beyond A's
power of control, and consequently
there was a completed gift of the
distributed income on the date of
distribution from the trust.
Joint Accounts and Savings Bonds

One of the most commonly re
curring examples of an incomplete
transfer is the creation of a joint
bank account. Since the grantor
alone may withdraw any Of all of
the funds from the joint account,
he has retained a power of revoca
tion and there is no completed gift.
However, when the donee actually
withdraws funds from the account
and thereby removes those funds
from the control of the grantor,
there is a gift of the funds in ques
tion at the date of withdrawal.
Treas. Reg. §25.2511-l(h)(4). Of
course, if local law required the
donee to return the withdrawn
funds upon the donor's demand,
the gift would not be complete on
withdrawal; but if the donor fails
to demand return of the funds, at
some subsequent date the donor's
inaction may be deemed his acqui
escence in the withdrawal, which
will then be a completed gift.
Similarly, if A purchases a
United States savings bond regis
tered as payable to "A or B,"
there is no gift to B unless and
until B surrenders the bond for
cash. Treas. Reg. §25.2511-l(h)(4).

91

TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED
INTERESTS

Transfers of property in which
the donor retains a reversionary in
terest are subject to the gift tax.
Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176
(1943).
Illustration a:
F transferred property to T in trust
for X for life, remainder to X's
children who are living at X's

·

death. There is a valid gift of the
remainder, even though X might
not have children at the time of
the transfer, and even if X has chil
dren living at that time, they might
not survive X, thus creating the
possibility that the property may
revert to F on X's death.
In this event, the value of the
donor's reversionary interest must
be deducted from the property
transferred in order to determine
the value of the gift. The donor ,
has the burden of proving the
value of his retained interest, and if
his interest is so speculative as to
have no ascertainable value under
recognized actuarial methods, the
91
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amount of the gift is treated as
equal to the entire value of the
property transferred. Robinette ti.
Helt1ering, 318 U.S. 184 (1943).
Treas. Reg. §25.2511-l(e). Simi
larly, if the donor retains a life
estate in the transferred property,
the gift tax will be imposed on the
value of the remainder. Robinette
ti. Helt1ering, 318 U.S. 184 (1943).
Of course, the retention of a life
estate will cause the inclusion of
the transferred property in the
gross estate of the donor upon his
death, notwithstanding the fact
that the transfer was previously
taxed under the gift tax laws. Code,
§2036.
Where the donor has transferred
property in trust and where a non
adverse third party, such as an in
dependent trustee, has the discre
tionary power to make distributions
of principal or income to the donor,
the gift tax consequences will de
pend upon the extent of the third
party's discretion. If the discretion
ary power of the third party to
make distributions to the grantor
is limited by an external standard,
then the donor's contingent interest
must be valued as of the date of
transfer. The amount of the com
pleted gift is deemed to be the
value of the property transferred
in trust less the value of the donor's
contingent interest. Rev. Rul. 54538, 1954-2 Cu.M. BuLL. 316.
Where the external standards are
so encompassing that there is no
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limit on the amount of trust cor
pus that might be distributed to the
donor, the gift will be treated as
incomplete. See Estate of Leon
Holtz, 38 T.C. 37 (1962), acqui
esced in, 1962-2 Cul\1. BuLL. 4; Com
missioner ti. Vander Weele, 254
F.2d 895 (6th Cir. 1958), aff'g
27 T.C. 340, acquiesced in, 1962-2
CuM. BuLL. 5. See also Rev. Rul.
62-13, 1962-1 Cur.1. BuLL. 181.
The Service has ruled that where
a third party is given very broad
discretion to make distributions of
principal to the donor, including
transfers where the third party's
power to invade is not limited by
external standards, so that there is
no assurance at the time of trans
fer that anything of value will pass
to a beneficiary of the trust, the gift
is not complete for gift tax pur
poses. Rev. Rul. 62-13, 1962-1 Cul\1.
BuLL. 181. But see Herzog ti. Com
missioner, 116 F.2d 591 (2d Cir.
1941).
VOID AND VOIDABLE TRANSFERS

1£ the transferor of property is
incompetent, his attempted trans
fer is void and no gift tax is im
posed. However, a gift tax will be
imposed upon a gift made by an
incompetent's lawfully appointed
guardian who was authorized to
make the gift on behalf of the in
competent. Rev. Rul. 67-280, 1967-2
Cul\1. BuLL. 349.
If the transferor of property is
under a temporary disability such
92
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as infancy, and if the transferor can
affirm or rescind the transfer when
the disability has been removed,
there is no gift at the time of trans
fer, but a gift will be deemed to
have been made when the trans
feror's disability is removed and he
does not rescind the transfer with
in a reasonable time. Commissioner
ti. Allen, 108 F.2d 961 (3d Cir.
1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 680
(1940).
It is not clear whether a transfer
that is voidable for reasons other
than disability, as, for example, a
transfer voidable under the Statute
of Frauds, is subject to the gift tax
when made.
NONRESIDENT ALIENS

From 1955 to 1966, a transfer of
intangible property made by a non
resident who was not a citizen and
who was not engaged in business
in the United States was exempt
from the gift tax. This provision
has been amended to delete the
nonbusiness requirement. Thus, for
1967 and all succeeding years, a
nonresident who is not a citizen
is exempt from the gift tax on
transfers of intangible property.
Code, §2501(a). This exemption
from gift tax may not apply to
gifts made by a donor within 10
years after having lost his Ameri-
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can citizenship. Code, §250l(a)(3).
However, the gift tax does apply
to transfers by a nonresident non
citizen of real property and tangi
ble personal property located in
the United States. A resident is a
person who was domiciled in the
United States at the time of the
gift. Treas. Reg. §25.2501-l(b).
SURVIVORSHIP ANNUITY BENEFITS

If an annuitant acquires an an
nuity for himself that contains a
provision for a survivorship annu
ity or for a refund upon the death
of the annuitant, a taxable gift
from the annuitant to the bene
ficiary entitled to the survivorship
or refund benefits is made on the
date that the designation of such
beneficiary becomes irrevocable. See
Treas. Reg. §25.2512-6, Ex. (5);
I.T. 3322, 1939-2 CuM. BuLL. 177;
Rev. Rul. 70-514, 1970-2 CuM. BuLL.
198; Rev. Rul. 72-62, 1972-1 CuM.
BuLL. 312; Wagner, fr. ti. United
States, 387 F.2d 966 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
However, no gift tax is imposed
where an irrevocable designation of
the beneficiary is made by an em
ployee entitled to an annuity under
certain qualified deferred compen
sation plans, except to the extent
that the value of the annuity is
attributable to contributions of the
employee. Code, §2517.

A man's rights often depend upon his estimating correctly what a
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
jury will later decide.
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